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IN T R O D U C T IO N
The liability of state highway departments and of highway personnel
for defective highway design, construction, and maintenance is a difficult
area of the law to state in hard and fast rules. It is not that the basic
concepts are difficult to understand, rather it is that they are difficult to
apply to given factual situations. It is my intention today to highlight a
few of the major principles applicable to suits against the state or public
official for negligence or defects in the design, construction, or mainte
nance of highways. Because a suit against a public official or employee
in his personal capacity is an alternative open to plaintiffs and is similar
in principle, I want to discuss and compare it to suits against the state.
Before discussing specifically the areas of design, construction, and main
tenance, I want to give you some background information.
B A C K G R O U N D IN F O R M A T IO N
As you may know, the suit for negligence against the state highway
department is a fairly recent development. Early in our history Ameri
can courts held that states had sovereign immunity from suit that could
only be waived by legislative consent. Today, many states permit, in one
way or another, an action against the state for negligence in the per
formance of certain public functions, including highway operations.
Because of this doctrine of state immunity in the past, many litigants
were compelled to find another means of redress in the courts for injuries
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caused by highway defects. Claimants as a second choice were relegated
usually to suing the highway official or employee in his personal capacity
for negligent conduct of his duties.
Several distinctions exist between personal liability and state liability.
First, because the state acts through its agents and employees, state lia
bility is based on the doctrine of respondant superior; that is, the master
is liable for the acts of his servants. It follows that where the public
employee performs a negligent act that does not fall within the excep
tion to liability the state agency may be held liable in a tort suit.
The law of public official and employee personal liability, on the
other hand, does not apply the doctrine of respondant superior to officials
and employees. For example, a supervisor may not be held personally
liable for the negligent acts of his subordinates. The supervisor would
be accountable only if he personally participated in the negligent conduct
or was negligent in the selection of the employee.
Moreover, it may be noted that the public official or employee is not
protected by any umbrella of state or sovereign immunity. In the
absence of statute, the general view is that the public official or employee
may be held personally liable for his negligence even though the state is
immune from suit or liability for the negligence of its agents.
The two areas of law are similar in that the courts have developed
certain rules or tests to limit liability to those areas in which it is
thought proper to impose liability for negligent conduct. Neither the
liability of the state nor of the public official is determined exactly in
the same manner as if the suit were brought against a private person or
corporation. Thus, states and officials or employees, although there are
exceptions, are generally held not liable for performing negligently their
discretionary functions or activities, or, to put it another way, for per
forming duties that require the exercise of judgment and discretion.
W here state officials or employees are involved, the general rule is that
they are not liable for negligence committed during the exercise or
performance of an official duty discretionary in nature. The rule of
privilege does not apply, however, if the official was acting out of malice,
committing an intentional tort, exceeding his jurisdiction or acting out
side the scope of his employment (such as by trespassing on the property
of another). Similarly, where the state is sued for negligence in the
conduct of highway operations, the prevalent defense is that the depart
ment is not liable for negligence in the conduct of certain discretionary
functions or duties.
T he term discretion is not an easy one to define. Any activity in
volves the exercise of discretion, but here it means the power and duty
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to make a choice among valid alternatives; it requires a consideration of
alternatives and the exercise of independent judgment in arriving at a
decision or in choosing a course of action. Discretionary acts are those
in which there is no hard and fast rule as to a course of conduct that
one must or must not take. On the other hand, ministerial duties are
more likely to involve clearly defined tasks not permitting the exercise
of discretion. Ministerial acts are those performed with minimum
leeway as to personal judgment and do not require any evaluating or
weighing of alternatives before the undertaking of the duty to be
performed.
There are several reasons for these rules that result in conditional
immunity of the state or the public employee. As you know, under the
separation-of-powers doctrine in this country, each coordinate branch
of government is vested with certain powers and responsibilities. Be
cause of this separation of powers, the courts are reluctant to secondguess discretionary decisions made by executive bodies; otherwise, the
judiciary would be usurping the role of executive departments. More
over, the courts are thought in certain cases to lack the necessary
expertise to make some judgments that are entrusted to expert bodies
having specialized knowledge and understanding of the problems in
their own area. The courts share the view that to subject public agen
cies to general liability for errors or defects in the plan or design of
public improvements such as highways would result in the submission
of the propriety, adequacy, and sufficiency of the design to the judgment,
not of competent and skilled engineers, but of a jury of untrained
laymen.
Reasons that the courts are reluctant to impose personal liability on
a public official or employee are that the public agent, in sharp contrast
to a private person, has a duty to act and execute his responsibilities, and
the vigorous action needed on the part of public officials and employees
to carry out public functions would be seriously impaired if all actions
that they are required to perform were subjected to personal liability.
In sum, the courts are balancing two policies: On the one hand, the
need for orderly administration of governmental functions, and, on the
other, the need to compensate victims of injuries resulting from the
negligent performance of government functions. In order to perform
this balancing, the common law formulated the discretionary-ministerial
test in the area of personal liability that was later applied in negligence
suits brought against the state.
It may be noted, too, that a number of states have tort claims acts.
These acts constitute a waiver of immunity from suit and liability with
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certain exceptions. Although these acts differ from state to state, they
are modeled on the federal tort claims act that was enacted in 1946.
One common feature of the tort claims acts is the inclusion of a provi
sion immunizing the state or public entity from suit arising out of the
performance of certain discretionary functions. The exclusion is based,
of course, on the discretionary-ministerial test developed by the court
in the law of personal liability.
In those states having a tort claims act with a discretionary function
exemption, the term discretion has been interpreted more narrowly than
in other states applying the common law. Discretionary acts are really
discretionary only where there is a determination of policy based on a
consideration of policy-type factors. Usually, such discretion is exercised
only at the “planning level.” Even though some discretion may be
involved in lower, operational-level decisions, courts generally hold that
discretion exercised below the planning level is not an exercise of dis
cretion within the meaning of the statutes. Moreover, some courts hold
that once immune discretion is exercised at the planning level, the dis
cretion is exhausted and any negligence in the execution of the decision
may result in liability.
H IG H W A Y D E SIG N L IA B IL IT Y
L et’s first consider the extent to which highway design is discre
tionary and immune from liability. It has been generally held that the
actual plan and design of a highway are protected from liability because
they are functions that involve the exercise of discretion and judgment.
Neither states and state agencies nor public officials and employees are
liable for errors of judgment in planning and designing public improve
ments. W here actions have been brought against public officials, states,
or highway departments, it has been held, for example, that there is no
liability for an injury arising out of a highway plan or design having a
defectively designed traffic light, curve, curbs, drain, culvert, intersection,
medians, shoulders, safety islands, crosswalks, or highway exits. Simi
larly, suits against highway personnel have held that the elevation of
grade, erection of guard rails, and installation of culverts and traffic
control devices are immune from liability, because they are all decisions
requiring the exercise of independent judgment and discretion after a
consideration of traffic requirements.
The general rule, therefore, is that public entities are protected from
liability where the claim arises out of a defectively designed highway. A
leading illustration of that principle is Weiss v. Fote, a New York case,
where it was alleged that the Board of Safety of the City of Buffalo
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had approved a traffic light with too short a clearance interval; that is,
not enough time was allowed for east-west traffic to clear the intersection
before north-south traffic was green-lighted. The court held, however,
that the adequacy of the design of this traffic light could not be sub
mitted to a jury for a determination of the negligence of the city.
The court stated:
“Lawfully authorized planning by governmental bodies has a
unique character deserving of special treatment as regards the extent
to which it may give rise to tort liability. It is proper and necessary
to hold municipalities and the state liable for injuries arising out of
the day-by-day operations of government— for instance, the garden
variety injury resulting from the negligent maintenance of a high
way— but to submit to a jury the reasonableness of the lawfully
authorized deliberations of executive bodies presents a different
question. T o accept a jury’s verdict as to the reasonableness and
safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over the
judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and
passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental
operations and to place in inexpert hands what the legislature has
seen fit to entrust to experts."
There are exceptions to this general rule of immunity for design
defects. Some courts hold that liability for defective design may be
imposed if the defect is one of such a character as to be apparent to
anyone of ordinary intelligence and judgment; others hold that the
defect must be one that was “obviously dangerous” at the time of its
approval, or “manifestly dangerous,” or “obviously and palpably danger
ous.” Another jurisdiction holds that for the state to be liable for a
design defect, it must be one that renders the highway totally out of
repair from the very beginning.
An example of a design defect in which the court held the public
entity liable is Paul v. Faricy. The court held that a traffic island was so
negligently designed at its inception that it was obviously and palpably
dangerous to the ordinarily prudent man of reasonable intelligence. In
that case, the defendant’s vehicle struck the inclined apron of a safety
island intended to be used by pedestrians for boarding other vehicles.
T he front of the safety island facing the on-coming traffic consisted of a
concrete apron about 15 ft. long which at its extreme westerly end was
10 in. high and which gradually increased to a height of 2 ft. above the
pavement at its easterly end. Adjoining the easterly end of the apron
stood a concrete bumper block or pier which rested upon but was not
anchored to the pavement.
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This block, in which traffic lights were imbedded, was 4 ft. high,
about 3 I/2 ft. wide, and 2 ft. thick and weighed approximately 4,200 lb.
T he apparent purpose of the entire design was to protect pedestrians
standing on the safety island, as well as occupants of automobiles collid
ing with the safety island, in that the concrete apron by its sloping
design would slow down a colliding automobile before it was stopped
by the 4,200-lb. bumper block.
O f course, the inevitable happened— the 11-year-old plaintiff was
standing on the safety island when the car, driven by Faricy, hit the
concrete apron, continued forward and upward onto the apron until it
struck the unanchored bumper block, which by force of the impact
tipped over onto the platform and struck the plaintiff.
T he court noted that the general rule was governmental immunity
for defects in the plan or design of highways, that the plan was consid
ered and approved by the appropriate body, that a competent engineer,
after having examined a number of traffic islands, had designed this
island, and that there were some differences in opinion on designing and
building a traffic island. However, the city was held liable on the basis
that there was no reasonable necessity for the obvious danger presented
by the unanchored 2-ton block. The court asked:
“W hat could be a more palpable source of danger to pedestrians,
than an unanchored block weighing two tons and equipped with a
ramp to direct the force of colliding automobiles at a point above
its center of gravity? As a safety measure, it violated the most
elementary laws of physics and presented a danger that must have
been apparent to any reasonably prudent man. Those who are
charged with the responsibility of exercising a bona fide judgment in
matters of structural design are entitled to place great reliance upon
the advice of an expert but such expert advice may not be used as
a shield to justify a failure to perceive a defect that is wholly
unnecessary and which is not only apparent but is so obviously and
palpably dangerous that no reasonably prudent man would approve
its adoption.”
Insofar as immunity for design defects is concerned, the case of
Smith v. Cooper held flatly that state employees are generally immune
from liability for alleged negligence in planning and designing high
ways. In Smith certain officers and employees of the Oregon State
Highway Commission were alleged to have been negligent in designing
a tight unbanked curve, painting a center stripe to indicate that traffic
was to continue straight ahead, failing to post signs warning of the
dangerous condition of the road, and failing to erect a guardrail at the
edge of the turn where the fatal accident occurred.
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The court held, however, that these allegations charged conduct by
the executive branch of the government that should not be reviewed by
the judicial branch. The court noted that that the decisions that were
made to do or not to do these things were dependent upon considera
tions that a court or jury should not consider, particularly by hindsight,
such as the funds available for the project, the amount of additional
land necessary to make a more gradual curve, the cost of the land, the
loss of the land for recreational or agricultural purposes, the amount and
kind of traffic contemplated, and the evaluation of traffic and safety
technical data. In Smith however, the court suggested that gross negli
gence in highway design would not be immunized; for example, officials
could not design a road to end at the edge of a cliff.
A troublesome question concerning design immunity is whether im
munity, once attached, is perpetual? The general rule is that the rea
sonableness or adequacy of a plan or design is measured by the standards
prevalent at the time of its adoption or approval. California, however, is
one jurisdiction in which design immunity has been held not to be
perpetual. T h at is, the state has the duty to review a plan and undertake
corrective action where changed traffic or other conditions demonstrate
that a design has become dangerous in actual practice. Although previous
California decisions had held that design immunity remained intact even
though changed circumstances had clearly revealed the defects of the
plan, these precedents were reversed by Baldwin v. State.
In Baldwin, the plaintiff had stopped his pickup truck in the fast or
inside lane of traffic in order to make a left turn. While stopped there,
his truck was struck from the rear by another northbound vehicle, and
knocked into southbound traffic, where the truck collided with another
vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the state was negligent in the design
of the intersection because of the absence of a left-turn lane and of the
failure to warn of the dangerous condition.
The evidence at trial established that in the preceding 3.7 years,
42 accidents occurred at the crossing, causing four deaths. Numerous
requests, reports and studies had been prompted by the intersection
because of the large increase in traffic since the boulevard was con
structed in 1942. Despite this showing the state defended on the basis
that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the state’s design immunity
statute. T he court, however, reversing its earlier position on the
perpetuity of design immunity, held th a t:
“Having approved the plan or design, the governmental entity
may not, ostrich-like, hide its head in the blueprints, blithely ignor
ing the actual operation of the plan. Once the entity has notice that
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the plan or design under changed physical conditions has produced
a dangerous condition of public property, it must act reasonably to
correct or alleviate the hazard.”
Of the other states that have considered the question, New Jersey,
in a comment to its design immunity provision has stated that design
immunity is perpetual; Kansas courts hold that design must be judged
by the standards in existence at the time of the plan’s adoption. One
New York decision suggested that there is a duty on the part of the
public entity to correct a highway design if it is shown later that
changed conditions have rendered the design hazardous in actual use.
Although a few jurisdictions (California or New York) may require
the highway department to review a plan or design where there are
changed conditions, no cases have been found imposing this duty on
individuals such as highway officials and employees where they are sued
personally.
H IG H W A Y C O N S T R U C T IO N L IA B IL IT Y
W here a claim arises out of negligent highway construction, the
state will want to defend again as the basis that the negligence is
immunized because of the discretion vested in the department; however,
negligent construction is more likely to result in liability.
The cases appear to establish three general rules where a claim
arises out of negligent construction:
(1)

(2)

(3)

If the plan or design itself dictates the specifications, sched
ules, or details of the operation.. . . which, when carefully
adhered to, give rise to the claim, the discretionary defense is
applicable;
If there is wrongful deviation from, or negligence in carrying
out, the design, specifications, schedules, or other details or
operation set forth in the overall plan, the discretionary de
fense is not applicable; or
If the overall plan is only general in terms and silent as to
some details, there is a conflict of view as to whether the
discretionary defense applies if the remaining details are
supplied, negligently, at the time of construction.

Three highway cases involving negligent implementation of a plan
or design are McCauley v. State, a New York case, Cameron v. State,
a California case, and State v. Abbott, an Alaska decision. In McCauley,
the decedent skidded through the space between roadside guardposts
and plunged over a steep bank into a river. The court held that the
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state had a duty to protect against the danger presented by the steep
bank that was not met where the positioning of the guardposts did not
conform to the contract plans and were far enough apart to permit the
decedent’s car to pass between them. Thus, the deviation from a plan
or design, or the negligent execution or construction of the design, is
evidence that the state has not exercised reasonable care.
Another exception to design immunity is presented where the high
way in actual use has a design feature that was not approved in the
overall plan or design of the highway. In Cameron v. State, plaintiff’s
automobile went out of control on an S-curve that the court found to
be a dangerous condition because of an uneven superelevation. The
state was not protected by its design immunity statute, because the
uneven superelevation was not an included feature of the highway
design.
In the case of State v. Abbott, the negligent execution of a policylevel decision was not protected or immunized by the discretionary func
tion exemption in the Alaska T o rt Claims Act. Plaintiff was severely
injured when the car in which she was riding skidded out of control
on a sharp curve and struck an oncoming truck. A t the time of the
accident, the road was covered with ice and had not been sanded in
accordance with the state’s standard operating procedure. The court held
the department liable, because once the state made the decision to
provide winter maintenance, the program could not be implemented
negligently. The court stated:
“Once the initial policy determination is made to maintain
the highway through the winter by melting, sanding, and plowing
it, the individual district engineer’s decisions as to how that decision
should be carried out in terms of men and machinery is made at
the operational level; it merely implements the basic policy decision.
Once the basic decision to maintain the highway in a safe condition
throughout the winter is reached, the state should not be given
discretion to do so negligently. The decisions at issue in this case
simply do not rise to the level of government policy decisions
calling for judicial restraint. Under these circumstances the discre
tionary function exemption has no proper application.”
H IG H W A Y M A IN T E N A N C E L IA B IL IT Y
W here a claim arises out of negligent maintenance, the state or
public official or employee is most likely to be held liable. The cases
dealing with the maintenance area, however, seem to recognize some
immunity for maintenance planning where the individual officer or
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employee is sued personally. Thus, where maintenance activity gives
rise to a claim against a public official or employee, the courts hold that
the individual is not liable for the exercise of discretion in deciding
the need for repairs, the time and place of making repairs, the materials
to be used, or the method of making repairs. The courts have held
public officials and employees liable for ministerial acts such as leaving
open culverts across a highway or failing to warn of and guard against
open excavations. Moreover, the operation of motorized vehicles is
generally held to be a ministerial function.
As I stated, the discretionary function exemption construed in state
liability cases is not so broad. Because maintenance planning is not
thought by the courts to be a true exercise of discretion in the sense
of evaluating and assessing basic policy factors, the performance of
maintenance tasks is considered to be low level, operational-level activity.
It does not matter if the maintenance duties require the exercise of some
discretion such as the choice of materials to be used or the time of
making repairs. Thus, states have been held liable for negligence in
locating road signs and center stripes; for the decision as to the type of
highway barrier to be used; and for the allocation of men and materials
required to remove snow and ice from the highway. All were held to
involve operational-level functions that were not protected by the
discretionary defense. Because maintenance is viewed as routine house
keeping, low level, operational-level activity that is not discretionary
in nature, states are most likely to be held liable for negligent main
tenance. In sharp contrast, some personal liability cases recognize that
maintenance planning, like design, involves the exercise of discretion.
SU M M A R Y
T o summarize briefly, the matter of tort liability of state highway
departments for design, construction, and maintenance negligence has
received varying treatment by the courts. Most jurisdictions recognize
an exemption from liability for negligence in the performance of or
failure to perform, discretionary activities. W here highway operations
are at issue, the question often becomes whether the activity or decision
involved falls within the exemption from liability for discretionary
functions or duties.
The cases generally hold that the design of a highway is discre
tionary, because it involves high-level planning activity with the evalua
tion of policy factors. Moreover, design functions, considered to be
quasi-legislative in nature, are usually immune from “second-guessing”
by the courts, which are inexpert at making such decisions. Design
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immunity statutes represent a further effort by legislatures to immunize
governmental bodies from liability arising out of negligence or errors
in a plan or design where the same was duly approved under current
standards of reasonable safety.
T he courts have noted exceptions to design immunity: (1) where
the approval of a plan or design was arbitrary, unreasonable, or made
without adequate consideration; (2) where a plan or design was
prepared without adequate care; (3) where it contained an inherent,
manifestly dangerous defect or was defective from the very beginning
of actual use; and (4) where changed conditions demonstrate the need
for additional or remedial state action. The latter duty to review a
plan or design because of changed conditions has not been applied, to
my knowledge, thus far in suits against highway officials and employees.
Negligent construction is not likely to be immunized by reason of
the discretionary defense, particularly where the condition deviates from
the approved plan or design or where there is negligence in implementing
the plan or design, such as by introducing a feature never considered in
the design phase. Construction negligence may be protected from
liability where the plan or design specifies in detail how a feature is
to be completed and the specifications, carefully adhered to, give rise
to the injury.
Negligent maintenance is least likely to be immune from liability.
Courts tend to consider this phase of highway operations as routine
housekeeping necessary in the performance of normal day-to-day gov
ernment administration. Highway maintenance is exercised at the
operational-level, and even though discretion to some extent is involved,
the discretionary decisions to be made are not policy-oriented. Only in
suits against public officials and employees have the courts recognized
that maintenance planning requires the exercise of discretion.

